Introduction {#Sec1}
============

There are many situations where a society needs to select a subset of a given size from the set of available options. For example, in indirect democracies people choose representatives to govern on their behalf, companies select groups of products to promote to their customers (Lu and Boutilier [@CR37], [@CR38]; Skowron et al. [@CR48]), search engines decide which webpages to display in response to a given query (Dwork et al. [@CR19]), and among many applicants for a job (e.g., a tenure-track position at a university) several get short-listed and invited for interviews. For all these tasks we need formal rules to perform the selection, and the desirable properties of such rules may depend on the task at hand. We view these selection rules as multiwinner voting rules which, given individual preferences and the desired number of winners, output groups of winners, which we call *committees*.

Multiwinner elections are even more ubiquitous than single-winner ones, but much less studied. They were implicitly considered under the umbrella of choice functions (Arrow [@CR1]; Fishburn [@CR26]), but in this model the size of the elected committee could not be controlled. It was Debord ([@CR16]) and Felsenthal and Maoz ([@CR25]) who introduced several *k*-choice functions that elect committees of size exactly *k*, and investigated their properties. However, even within the space of rules that elect exactly *k* winners, many distinct models can happily coexist. One way to classify them is according to the type of the input: there are preference-based rules (whose inputs are sequences of linear orders; see, e.g., the work of Brams and Fishburn ([@CR7])), approval-based rules (whose inputs are sequences of dichotomies; see, e.g., the works of Brams et al. ([@CR8]), Caragiannis et al. ([@CR11]), Kilgour and Marshall ([@CR34]), Aziz et al. ([@CR2]), and the overview by Kilgour ([@CR33])), and tournament-based rules (whose inputs are either tournaments or weighted tournaments; see the book of Laslier ([@CR36]) for a general overview of tournament-based rules). Also, a number of authors consider settings where the compatibility of committee members is an important issue, and therefore voters' preferences over committees cannot be deduced from their preferences over individual alternatives alone (Ratliff [@CR43]; Uckelman [@CR56]; Ratliff and Saari [@CR44]). For a different perspective on this issue, see the line of work on voting in combinatorial domains ( Lang and Xia ([@CR35]) offer a very good overview of this area).

In this work, we focus on the model where the goal is to select a committee of a given size on the basis of voters' ordinal preferences over the candidates. A number of rules for this task are based on various forms of the Condorcet principle (Fishburn [@CR27], [@CR28]; Gehrlein [@CR29]; Kaymak and Sanver [@CR31]; Ratliff [@CR42]; Barberà and Coelho [@CR3]; Elkind et al. [@CR22]). In contrast, we consider rules that, informally speaking, can be seen as counterparts of positional scoring rules. Our aim is to present a uniform framework for the study of such rules, to identify useful classes of score-based committee selection rules, and to propose a set of natural properties (axioms) against which multiwinner rules can be judged.

We have selected ten voting rules as examples of different ideas pertaining to score-based committee selection: STV, SNTV, *k*-Borda, Bloc, three variants of the Chamberlin--Courant rule (Chamberlin and Courant [@CR12]; Lu and Boutilier [@CR37]; Betzler et al. [@CR4]), and three variants of the Monroe rule (Monroe [@CR39]; Betzler et al. [@CR4]; Skowron et al. [@CR49]). STV and SNTV are well-known rules that are used for parliamentary elections in several countries;[1](#Fn1){ref-type="fn"} Bloc is a rule that asks each voter to specify her favourite committee of *k* candidates and selects *k* candidates that were mentioned more frequently than others; *k*-Borda picks *k* alternatives with the highest Borda scores and is representative of rules used for choosing *k* finalists in a competition (indeed, Formula 1 racing and the Eurovision song contest use scoring rules very similar to Borda). The Chamberlin--Courant and Monroe rules are examples of rules that, like STV, focus on proportional representation, but, unlike STV, explicitly assign a committee member (a representative) to each voter. We also consider two rules that are based on approximation algorithms for, respectively, the Chamberlin--Courant rule (Lu and Boutilier [@CR37]) and the Monroe rule (Skowron et al. [@CR49]); that is, we treat these algorithms as voting rules in their own right. All these rules can be seen as being loosely based on single-winner scoring rules.

We are interested in judging the committee selection rules on our list with respect to their applicability in the following settings:**Parliamentary elections** Voting rules for such elections should respect the "one person, one vote" principle. This is reflected in the requirement that each elected member should represent approximately the same number of voters. Some such rules make use of electoral districts, i.e., they are based on holding separate (possibly multiwinner) elections in different parts of the country, while others treat the whole country as a single constituency, and focus on proportional representation of different population groups or political parties.**Shortlisting** Consider a situation where a position is filled at a university. Each faculty member ranks applicants in order to create a short-list of those to be invited for an interview. One of the important requirements in this case is that if some candidate is shortlisted when *k* applicants are selected, then this candidate should also be shortlisted if the list is extended to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k+1$$\end{document}$ applicants.**Movie selection** Based on rankings provided by different customer groups, an airline has to decide which (few) movies to offer on their long-distance flights. It is important that each passenger finds something satisfying to watch. This task is similar to parliamentary elections, but without the need to ensure that each movie would be watched by the same number of people. It is, however, quite different from shortlisting: If there are two similar job candidates, then it is desirable to interview either both of them or neither of them, whereas if two movies are similar, it makes sense to pick at most one of them. Skowron et al. ([@CR48]) discuss this view of multiwinner elections and provide a number of other examples and applications.

We study properties of voting rules that are relevant to the above-listed settings. Specifically, we discuss properties that are specific to the task of committee selection, such as committee monotonicity, the solid coalitions property, and the consensus committee property, and adapt the standard notions of unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity, and consistency to the multiwinner setting. For every such property $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathcal{P}$$\end{document}$ (sometimes we need to place mild technical conditions on the input, e.g., a rule may satisfy a certain property only if the target committee size divides the number of voters or if the number of voters is sufficiently large). Our results are summarized in Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} (see Sect. [10](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"}).

In the course of our investigation, we identify an important class of committee selection rules, which we call *committee scoring rules*. Within the class of committee scoring rules, we distinguish *(weakly) separable rules* and *representation-focused rules*. These notions prove to be useful for our analysis, as some axioms turn out to be satisfied by all rules that belong to one of these subclasses, or by an easily identifiable subset of such rules (see, e.g., Theorem [3](#FPar26){ref-type="sec"}). Further, we obtain a simple and intuitive characterization of separable committee scoring rules. Namely, we show that all such rules are *best-k* rules; roughly speaking, this means that each such rule first ranks all candidates and then outputs the top *k* candidates according to this ranking. We believe that introducing the class of committee scoring rules is one of the most important contributions of this paper. In a series of follow-up papers, Faliszewski et al. conduct a more detailed study of the internal structure of this class of rules (Faliszewski et al. [@CR23], [@CR24]) and Skowron et al. ([@CR50]) provide an axiomatic characterization of such rules.

Our paper is a preliminary attempt to develop a formal framework for the study of preference-based committee selection rules. Thus we use the word *axiom* quite freely, without implying that our axioms should be viewed as *normative requirements*. Further, our work focuses on committee selection rules that are based on scoring procedures. Such rules are fundamentally different from those that are motivated by the Condorcet criterion. In particular, in the single-winner case, no scoring rule is Condorcet consistent; consequently, a committee selection rule that reduces to a scoring rule for the case when the target committee size equals one cannot satisfy any reasonable extension of the Condorcet criterion.[2](#Fn2){ref-type="fn"} It would be very interesting to apply our framework to Condorcet-based rules. However, this task is beyond the scope of this paper, and we leave it as future work.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. [2](#Sec2){ref-type="sec"} we introduce the basic terminology used throughout the paper; in Sect. [3](#Sec3){ref-type="sec"} we define the rules that we study and put forward two ways of classifying them. In Sect. [4](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}, we define several properties of committee selection rules, and in Sects. [5](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"}--[8](#Sec10){ref-type="sec"} we study particular groups of these properties in detail. We discuss related literature in Sect. [9](#Sec11){ref-type="sec"} and conclude in Sect. [10](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"}.
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A *committee selection rule* (or, a *multiwinner rule*) $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}(E,k)$$\end{document}$ of *k*-element subsets of *C*, which we call *committees*. That is, a rule returns the set of committees that are tied for winning. In practice, one would need to combine such a rule with a tie-breaking mechanism, but for simplicity we mostly disregard this issue here. Brams and Fishburn ([@CR7]) introduced *choose-k* rules, but their definition stipulates that such a rule selects *at least* *k* alternatives. Two early papers that focus on rules selecting committees of size *exactly* *k* are those of Debord ([@CR16]) and of Felsenthal and Maoz ([@CR25]).

Requiring committee selection rules to pick fixed-size committees is natural if, for example, the goal is to elect a parliament whose size is fixed by the constitution. However, as a consequence, we are sometimes forced to elect committees that are Pareto dominated under reasonable preference extensions: e.g., if in each vote the candidates are ranked as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Committee selection rules {#Sec3}
=========================

We now provide definitions of the committee selection rules that we study and discuss two general ways of defining such rules.

Common committee selection rules {#Sec4}
--------------------------------

A number of committee selection rules are inspired by single-winner rules, so let us review these first. Many single-winner rules calculate the scores of alternatives in order to decide which one is the best. Here are some popular ways of computing the candidates' scores.**Plurality score** The *Plurality score* of a candidate *c* is the number of votes where *c* is ranked first.$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Example 1 {#FPar1}
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### Example 2 {#FPar2}
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**Computational complexity of winner determination** For $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ell \in \{\ell _1, \ell _{\min }\}$$\end{document}$, it is known that finding even a single winning committee is computationally hard (Procaccia et al. [@CR41]; Lu and Boutilier [@CR37]; Betzler et al. [@CR4]). However, many variants of these rules are fixed-parameter tractable, can be efficiently approximated, or admit polynomial-time algorithms when voters' preferences are drawn from restricted domains (Lu and Boutilier [@CR37]; Betzler et al. [@CR4]; Cornaz et al. [@CR14]; Yu et al. [@CR59]; Skowron et al. [@CR49], [@CR48]; Skowron and Faliszewski [@CR47]; Skowron et al. [@CR51]; Elkind and Ismaili [@CR21]; Peters and Elkind [@CR40]). For other rules that we study, one can output *some* winning committee in polynomial time. Moreover, for SNTV, Bloc, and *k*-Borda it is easy to decide whether a given committee *W* of size *k* is among the winning committees for a given election, i.e., whether the ties that occur during the application of the rule can be broken so that the rule outputs *W*. In contrast, for STV the latter problem is NP-hard even for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k=1$$\end{document}$ (Conitzer et al. [@CR13]). For Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe the complexity of checking if a given committee may win under some way of breaking ties is currently unknown. However, both of these rules can be combined with a simple tie-breaking mechanism so that the resulting rule is polynomial-time computable; moreover, these mechanisms do not interfere with the axiomatic analysis presented in this work.

Two types of multiwinner rules {#Sec5}
------------------------------

Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that many of the rules introduced so far have very similar internal structure. Below we present two natural ways of identifying these similarities.
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf{k}$$\end{document}$ **Rules** SNTV and *k*-Borda are natural extensions of Plurality and Borda to the multiwinner setting: we sort the candidates in the order of decreasing scores (breaking ties in all possible ways) and pick the top *k* ones.

We remind the reader that a *social preference function* is a mapping that, given an election (*C*, *V*), returns a set of tied linear orders over *C*; a *social welfare function*, given an election (*C*, *V*), returns a single (possibly weak) order over *C*. By considering all linear orders that refine this weak order (which can be seen as a variant of the parallel-universes tie-breaking), we can convert a social welfare function into a social preference function; this enables us to treat social welfare functions as special cases of social preference functions. Hence a social preference function is a more general object than a social welfare function.

### Definition 1 {#FPar3}
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We can also define a best-*k* rule based on the social preference function known as the Kemeny ranking (Kemeny [@CR32]), and, somewhat surprisingly, we will later demonstrate that Greedy-CC is also a best-*k* rule. Thus, best-*k* rules are a more diverse group than one might at first expect.
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Many of the rules that we study are, in fact, committee scoring rules.

### Example 3 {#FPar5}
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Example [3](#FPar5){ref-type="sec"} motivates the following definition.

### Definition 3 {#FPar6}
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### Theorem 1 {#FPar7}

Every separable committee scoring rule is a best-*k* rule for some scoring social welfare function.

It can be shown that Bloc is not a best-*k* rule (this will follow, in particular, from Theorem [2](#FPar10){ref-type="sec"} and Proposition [3](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"}) and hence it is not a separable committee scoring rule. Indeed, in some ways Bloc is quite different from separable rules (for instance, it satisfies the fixed majority property, defined in the end of Sect. [4](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}, which is failed by many separable rules). On the other hand, at the formal level Bloc does look very similar to separable committee scoring rules, and, indeed, it shares a number of common features with them. The reason is that both separable committee scoring rules and Bloc belong to the class of weakly separable committee scoring rules, which we define below.

### Definition 4 {#FPar8}
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We emphasize that, unlike a separable committee scoring rule, a weakly separable committee scoring rule may be based on a scoring social welfare function whose score vector depends on *k* (as in the case of Bloc).

Our next proposition shows that weakly separable committee scoring rules are attractive rules from an algorithmic perspective; moreover, in Sect. [7](#Sec9){ref-type="sec"} we show that they have an interesting monotonicity property.

### Proposition 1 {#FPar9}
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On the other extreme, we have committee scoring rules whose committee scoring functions $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Axioms {#Sec6}
======

We now present some properties (axioms) that may be desirable for committee selection rules. We use the standard axioms for single-winner rules as our starting point, and modify them on the basis of ideas from the literature that are specific to committee selection. Due to our choice of focus, we do not include properties based on the Condorcet principle, such as, e.g., stability, as defined by Gehrlein ([@CR29]). We stress that, since committee selection rules have a very diverse range of applications, our properties should not necessarily be understood in the normative way: the desirability of a particular property can only be evaluated in the context of a specific application. Throughout this section, we write $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Our first axiom is *nonimposition*. It requires that each size-*k* set of candidates can be the unique winner. This is a basic requirement that is trivially satisfied by all rules that we consider.**Nonimposition** For each set of candidates *C* and each *k*-element subset *W* of *C*, there is an election $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}(tE,k) = {{\mathcal {R}}}(E,k)$$\end{document}$.We now consider monotonicity. If *c* belongs to a winning committee *W* then, generally speaking, we cannot expect *W* to remain winning when *c* is moved forward in some vote. For example, this shift may hurt other members of *W*. Indeed, none of our rules satisfies this strict version of monotonicity. However, there are two natural relaxations of this condition. One option is to require that after the shift *c* belongs to *some* winning committee. Alternatively, we may restrict forward movements of *c*, prohibiting it to overtake other members of *W*. (We point the reader to the work of Sanver and Zwicker ([@CR45]) for an extensive discussion of monotonicity in the context of irresolute voting rules.)**Monotonicity** For every election $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In Sect. [5](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"} we discuss committee monotonicity in detail and use it to axiomatize best-*k* rules. We note that committee monotonicity in the context of multiwinner voting has been discussed by other authors, but under different names and usually by arguing that it is paradoxical that a given voting rule fails committee monotonicity (Staring [@CR52]; Ratliff [@CR42]; Barberà and Coelho [@CR3]). In contrast, we argue (Sect. [5](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"}) that in some applications failing this axiom may be seen as a desirable feature of a committee selection rule.

The next three axioms represent three implementations of Dummett's condition known as *proportionality for solid coalitions* (Dummett [@CR18]). Dummett's original proposal is as follows: Consider an election with *n* voters where the goal is to pick *k* candidates. If for some $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Almost all rules considered in this paper fail to satisfy this axiom. For most of them, this is already the case in the single-winner setting, i.e., when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$W'\ne W$$\end{document}$ is lower than that of *W*. This is yet another feature that distinguishes Bloc from separable committee scoring rules (even though Bloc is weakly separable). For more detailed discussion of fixed-majority consistency in the context of committee scoring rules, we point the readers to the follow-up work of Faliszewski et al. ([@CR24]).

In the remainder of the paper, we consider the axioms listed in this section one by one, and, for each of them, we determine which of the voting rules described in Sect. [3](#Sec3){ref-type="sec"} satisfy it. A summary of our results is provided in Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} in Sect. [10](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"}.

Committee monotonicity {#Sec7}
======================

Some authors believe that committee monotonicity is an important requirement. In particular, Staring ([@CR52]) demonstrated that the Bloc rule is very far from being committee monotonic, and called this phenomenon the *increasing-committee-size paradox*. Specifically, he described a profile where the winning committee of size three was disjoint from the winning committee of size two, and the winning committee of size four was disjoint from both of them. A variant of the increasing-committee-size paradox has been recently considered by Kamwa and Merlin ([@CR30]). For several other rules (not considered in our paper), similar phenomena were observed by Ratliff ([@CR42]), in a paper titled "Some Startling Inconsistencies when Electing Committees". Barberà and Coelho ([@CR3]) argue that for shortlisting it is desirable to consider weakly Condorcet-consistent rules. They then show that weak Condorcet-consistency (which, in this context, they call *stability*) and committee monotonicity are incompatible, and argue that this is one reason why (weakly) Condorcet-consistent rules are not used in practice.

In contrast, we believe that the desirability of committee monotonicity depends strongly on the application. In particular, we agree with Barberà and Coelho ([@CR3]) that if we are choosing finalists of a competition, then it is imperative to use a rule that has this property; however, in the context of proportional representation insisting on a committee-monotone rule may prevent us from selecting a truly representative committee. Indeed, the latter point was already noted by Black. In his classical work Black ([@CR5]) considers a society with single-peaked preferences regarding the left-right political spectrum. He observes that if we are choosing a single candidate (i.e., if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The above intuition is further strengthened by the fact that committee monotonicity axiomatically characterizes the class of best-*k* rules.

Theorem 2 {#FPar10}
---------

A committee selection rule is committee-monotone if and only if it is a best-*k* rule.

Proof {#FPar11}
-----
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By combining Theorems [1](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"} and [2](#FPar10){ref-type="sec"}, we conclude that all separable committee scoring rules, including, in particular, SNTV and *k*-Borda, satisfy committee monotonicity. We will now show that Greedy-CC satisfies committee monotonicity as well, and hence it is a best-*k* rule.

Proposition 2 {#FPar12}
-------------

Greedy-CC satisfies committee monotonicity.

Proof {#FPar13}
-----
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Theorem [1](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"} shows that separable committee scoring rules are associated with scoring social welfare functions. In contrast, Greedy-CC cannot be defined in such a way and, in particular, the social preference function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Example 4 {#FPar14}
---------
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The remaining rules considered in our paper fail committee monotonicity (as mentioned above, the case of Bloc was resolved by Staring ([@CR52]); the proof of Proposition [3](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"} includes an explicit construction for Bloc for the sake of completeness).
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Corollary 1 {#FPar17}
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Dummett's proportionality {#Sec8}
=========================

Properties in the spirit of Dummett's proportionality condition (with the exception of unanimity) are geared toward rules that aim to achieve proportional representation of the voters. Thus, the results of this section can be used to judge committee selection rules from this perspective.

We start by considering the solid coalitions property. It is easy to see that it is satisfied by SNTV, and also by STV when the number of voters is sufficiently large.

Proposition 4 {#FPar18}
-------------
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Proposition 5 {#FPar20}
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Proposition 6 {#FPar22}
-------------

Greedy-Monroe has the solid coalitions property.

Proof {#FPar23}
-----
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We believe that the solid coalitions property is desirable, but not crucial for applications that aim at proportional representation (e.g., parliamentary elections): indeed, a voter may be reasonably well represented even if her top choice is not included in the committee. In contrast, the consensus committee property, which we discuss next, seems to be fundamental. Indeed, it is satisfied by almost all rules that aim to achieve proportional representation.

When *k* divides *n*, the consensus committee property is satisfied by every rule that has the solid coalitions property. In particular, it is satisfied by SNTV, STV (if there are sufficiently many voters) and Greedy-Monroe. It is also satisfied by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Bloc, *k*-Borda and Greedy-CC do not have the consensus committee property (nor the solid coalitions property).
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Our final instantiation of Dummett's proportionality for solid coalitions is the unanimity property. Every committee scoring rule satisfies its weak variant.

Theorem 4 {#FPar30}
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Monotonicity {#Sec9}
============

Being monotonic is a natural and easily satisfiable condition for single-winner rules. Among the few examples of prominent non-monotonic single-winner rules are STV and the Dodgson rule (see, e.g., the work of Brandt [@CR9]). In contrast, for multiwinner rules monotonicity is a rather demanding property. However, all committee scoring rules satisfy candidate monotonicity, and all weakly separable committee scoring rules satisfy non-crossing monotonicity.
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Theorem 6 {#FPar34}
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Every weakly separable committee scoring rule $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}$$\end{document}$ satisfies non-crossing monotonicity.

Proof {#FPar35}
-----

Consider an election $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$E = (C,V)$$\end{document}$ with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\Vert C\Vert =m$$\end{document}$. Let *W* be a committee in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}(E, k)$$\end{document}$ and let *c* be a candidate in *W*. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$f=\{f_{m, k}\}_{m\in {{\mathbb {N}}}, k\in [m]}$$\end{document}$ be a committee scoring function associated with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}$$\end{document}$, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$f_{m, k}(i_1, \ldots , i_k)=\sum _{t=1}^k \alpha _k^m(i_t)$$\end{document}$. Consider a vote *v* where *c* is ranked in position *i* and some candidate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$d\not \in W$$\end{document}$ is ranked just above *c*. Swap *c* and *d* in *v*. After the swap, every committee that contains *c* and not *d* gains the same number of points, namely, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _k^m(i-1) - \alpha _k^m(i)\ge 0$$\end{document}$; every committee that contains both *c* and *d* (or neither *c* nor *d*) maintains the same score, and every committee that contains *d* but not *c* loses $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _k^m(i-1) - \alpha _k^m(i) \ge 0$$\end{document}$ points. Thus *W* is a winning committee in the new election. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\square $$\end{document}$

In contrast, one of the implications of our next result is that a committee scoring rule that is not weakly separable may fail non-crossing monotonicity. (Indeed, in a follow-up paper, Faliszewski et al. ([@CR23]) have shown that among committee scoring rules, only weakly separable rules satisfy non-crossing monotonicity.)

Proposition 9 {#FPar36}
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Proof {#FPar41}
-----
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Consistency and homogeneity {#Sec10}
===========================

For single-winner rules, Young's famous theorem (Young [@CR58]) says that only scoring rules and their compositions satisfy consistency. The situation for multiwinner voting rules seems to be similar. Here, we show that every committee scoring rule satisfies consistency, whereas other rules we consider fail it. In a very recent paper, Skowron et al. ([@CR50]) provide a Young-style characterization of committee scoring rules, which explains our observations.

Theorem 7 {#FPar42}
---------

Every committee scoring rule satisfies consistency.

Proof {#FPar43}
-----
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Consider an arbitrary committee *Q* of size *k*. Since $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conversely, let *T* be some committee in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {R}}}(E_1+E_2, k)$$\end{document}$. Since *W* is a winning committee in both $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$E_1$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$E_2$$\end{document}$, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\text {sc}_{f, E_1}(W)\ge \text {sc}_{f, E_1}(T), \text {sc}_{f, E_2}(W)\ge \text {sc}_{f, E_2}(T)$$\end{document}$. On the other hand, since $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$T\in {{\mathcal {R}}}(E_1+E_2, k)$$\end{document}$, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\text {sc}_{f, E_1+E_2}(T) = \text {sc}_{f, E_1+E_2}(W)$$\end{document}$. Thus, both of the inequalities above hold with equality, and hence $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$T\in {{\mathcal {R}}}(E_1, k)$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$T\in {{\mathcal {R}}}(E_2, k)$$\end{document}$. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\square $$\end{document}$

Now let us turn our attention to the negative results. Note first that some of the rules we consider cannot be consistent by Young's theorem, because for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Corollary 2 {#FPar44}
-----------
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Proposition 12 {#FPar45}
--------------
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Proof {#FPar46}
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We now consider homogeneity. Naturally, committee scoring rules are homogeneous because consistency implies homogeneity. For other rules, the situation is more complex.
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We omit the formal proof of Proposition [13](#FPar47){ref-type="sec"}; for both rules, the result follows immediately from the definition of the rule.

Interestingly, none of the variants of Monroe's rule is homogeneous.
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On the positive side, if the number of voters is divisible by the target committee size, then $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ell _{\min }$$\end{document}$-Monroe are homogeneous. In essence, this means that these variants of Monroe's rule fail homogeneity because of rounding imposed by Monroe's criterion. One solution would be to clone each voter *k* times when seeking a committee of size *k*. We do not consider this modification of Monroe's rule here, as it is fundamentally incompatible with the idea of fully proportional representation: effectively, under this approach a voter would be fractionally represented by multiple candidates, and it is not clear how to interpret such assignments. However, it would be interesting to see how the satisfaction of a committee elected in this way compares to that of a committee elected without cloning.
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Proposition 16 {#FPar52}
--------------

Greedy-Monroe fails homogeneity even if the target committee size divides the number of voters.

Proof {#FPar53}
-----
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Proposition [16](#FPar52){ref-type="sec"} relies heavily on parallel-universes tie-breaking. It is possible to refine the intermediate tie-breaking procedure of Greedy-Monroe so that it becomes homogeneous when *k* divides $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Related work {#Sec11}
============

Having characterized a number of natural committee selection rules with respect to the axioms we proposed, we are now in a position to discuss how our results and approaches compare to prior work. The literature on the properties of committee selection rules is still somewhat sparse (at least compared to the body of work on single-winner rules), and it is scattered among different fields of research, ranging from behavioral science, through political science and social choice theory, to computer science. Here we review papers that are most similar in spirit to our work.

In a closely related paper, Felsenthal and Maoz ([@CR25]) consider four *k*-choice functions: the Plurality rule (i.e., in our terminology, the SNTV rule), the Approval rule,[4](#Fn4){ref-type="fn"} the Borda rule (i.e., *k*-Borda), and STV. They adapt a range of single-winner normative properties to the committee selection setting and study them in the context of these rules. In contrast with our work, they consider axioms motivated by the Condorcet principle, while we focus on axioms that capture ideas related to proportional representation. However, both papers consider monotonicity, though our analysis is somewhat more detailed in that we study two variants of this property (candidate monotonicity and non-crossing monotonicity), as well as committee monotonicity (Felsenthal and Maoz use the term 'continuity') and consistency (also known as reinforcement). Interestingly, consistency also plays an important role in the work of Bock et al. ([@CR6]) on consensus-based multiwinner rules. Debord ([@CR16]) also introduced several axioms for multiwinner rules. These axioms, however, are geared towards the rules that elect what he calls *k*-elites, which are multiwinner analogs of Condorcet winners.

Young's consistency-based characterization of scoring rules, as well as his characterization of the Borda rule, have already inspired researchers working on committee selection rules. For example, Debord ([@CR15]) extended Young's characterization of Borda to the case of *k*-Borda, and very recently Skowron et al. ([@CR50]) extended Young's ideas to characterize the class of committee scoring rules. Faliszewski et al. ([@CR24]) study a subclass of committee scoring rules which they call top-*k*-counting rules, and provide an axiomatic characterization of the Bloc rule, which belongs to this class. Faliszewski et al. ([@CR23]) propose a hierarchy of committee scoring rules.

Skowron ([@CR46]) offers a different perspective on committee selection rules. He assumes that the elected committee will have to make several decisions, i.e., vote on a number of issues, and that voters evaluate committees based on the final outcome of this two-stage process (which the voter can predict to a certain extent). The performance of a committee selection rule then depends on the single-winner voting rule that the committee will use to make its decisions. In this setting, several voting rules that we consider, such as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\ell _1$$\end{document}$-CC, emerge as optimal voting rules for appropriate assumptions about voters' preferences.

There is also a considerable amount of work on committee selection rules in the framework of approval voting. Kilgour ([@CR33]) describes a number of approval-based voting rules that elect a committee of fixed size and establishes some of their basic properties. Kilgour and Marshall ([@CR34]) give an excellent survey of approval-based committee selection rules and propose some new ones. A recent paper by Aziz et al. ([@CR2]) is conceptually similar to our work: there, the authors consider a number of popular approval-based committee selection rules, introduce a new axiom for such rules---similar in spirit to Dummett's solid coalitions property and called *justified representation*---and check which of the rules in their list satisfy it.

We conclude our discussion of related work by mentioning a very recent paper by Elkind et al. ([@CR20]), where the authors visually present aggregated outcomes of a number of multiwinner voting rules. Their experimental results confirm our theoretical predictions, and also reveal some effects that are hard to discover by purely theoretical means.Table 1Summary of resultsRuleCommitteeSolidConsensusUnanimityMonotonicityHomogeneityConsistencyMonotonicityCoalitionsCommitteeSTV$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conclusions {#Sec12}
===========

We formalized a number of natural properties of committee selection rules and conducted a comprehensive comparison of ten prominent committee selection rules with respect to these properties. Our results are summarized in Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"}. In the course of our study, we identified two natural families of committee selection rules---best-*k* rules and committee scoring rules---and related these families of rules to the properties we consider. In particular, we characterized best-*k* rules as the only rules that satisfy committee monotonicity, identified simple conditions on committee scoring rules that ensure the consensus committee property or non-crossing monotonicity, and showed that all committee scoring rules satisfy weak unanimity, candidate monotonicity, and consistency.

We believe that the results in this paper improve our understanding of applicability of various multiwinner rules to particular tasks. For example, we see that best-*k* rules are well-suited for selecting a group of finalists in a competition, whereas STV and rules based on Monroe's criterion ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ell _{\min }$$\end{document}$-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe) seem to be more appropriate for applications that require proportional representation (e.g., parliamentary elections).

In this context, Greedy-Monroe is particularly interesting. It was introduced as an approximation algorithm for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ell _1$$\end{document}$-CC, but unlike Greedy-Monroe) or the consensus committee property (unlike every other rule that focuses on some form of proportional representation). The latter fact can be seen as a consequence of Greedy-CC satisfying committee monotonicity (which we argued to be incompatible with the goal of proportional representation). Given this comparison, it is tempting to simply use Greedy-Monroe in place of Greedy-CC. However, perhaps a better idea would be to modify Greedy-Monroe by allowing it to decide how many voters to consider in each iteration. We believe that studying such variant of Greedy-Monroe is an important research direction.

Finally, our results regarding SNTV are quite interesting. This is the only separable committee scoring rule that is also representation-focused. Moreover, it satisfies almost all axioms considered in our work, except strong unanimity. One explanation for this fact is that it can be viewed as a 'budget-constrained' variant of the Tullock rule (Tullock [@CR55]); this is the rule that simply picks all the candidates that are ranked first by at least one voter. The Tullock rule possesses nice axiomatic properties, but cannot be used to output a committee of a given size. Of course, since SNTV ignores each voter's preferences beyond the top candidate, it may return highly counterintuitive results in many cases. For instance, it is extremely indecisive when voters are unanimous: in this case, it may return any committee containing the candidate ranked first by all voters (in particular, it may select a committee that does not include the candidate ranked second by all voters). Also, if the opinions are widely divided, a small group of voters can easily coordinate their efforts to get their preferred candidate elected, even if this candidate is ranked last by all other voters. These flaws of SNTV severely restrict the range of scenarios where it can be used.

For example, the upper house of the Parliament of Australia uses a variant of STV; a variant of SNTV is used, e.g., in Puerto Rico.

For several committee scoring rules (including SNTV, Bloc, and *k*-Borda), Diss and Doghmi ([@CR17]) consider the probability that a Condorcet committee in the sense of Gehrlein ([@CR29]) is elected, provided that one exists.

However, there is a variant of Dummett's condition known as *Droop Proportionality Criterion*, which uses the Droop quota in place of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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This rule is not preference-based.
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